On Monday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on a case involving the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause: Renico v. Lett (09-338). In this case, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Following a four day trial, the jurors began to deliberate. Not long into deliberation, the jury sent two notes to the trial court. The first stated that the jurors were concerned that their potentially protracted deliberations would interfere with other courthouse proceedings. In the second note, the jurors asked the court to explain what would happen if they could not reach a unanimous verdict. After receiving the second note, the trial judge asked the foreman if he believed the jurors could reach a verdict. He said "no" after some hesitation. The court declared a mistrial and another jury was sworn for the re-trial. Mr. Lett was convicted following the second trial.
On appeal, he argued that the re-trial resulted in a Double Jeopardy violation. Although the state appellate courts disagreed, he successfully argued in federal court that the trial court failed to take adequate steps to ensure that the jury was deadlocked before it declared a mistrial, resulting in a Fifth Amendment violation. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court's ruling.
The state, in its briefing to the Supreme Court, argued that the Fifth Amendment was not violated when the judge declared a mistrial based on "manifest necessity", a determination left to the "sound discretion" of the judge, because federal courts defer these decisions to state courts who are better equipped to made this determination. There is no concensus on what constitutes a "dead locked" jury and although the courts of appeal are split on the question of whether a finding of "manifest necessity" is warranted based on jury deliberations exceeding a specific time, AEDPA directs federal courts to use a highly deferential standard of review.
Mr. Lett countered by recognizing AEDPA's directives but argued that this deferential standard of review is due only when a trial judge uses "sound discretion." There is a presumption against terminating jury deliberations when a verdict favorable to the defendant could be returned. Further, the judge must ensure that the jury is truly unable to reach a unanimous verdict before a mistrial is declared.
Lastly, Mr. Lett submitted that the trial court did not adequately reflect on her decision and failed to give him the opportunity to object to the ruling. If the Supreme Court considers his silence at the conclusion of the first trial to be a waiver, that procedural bar could preclude any relief.
On appeal, he argued that the re-trial resulted in a Double Jeopardy violation. Although the state appellate courts disagreed, he successfully argued in federal court that the trial court failed to take adequate steps to ensure that the jury was deadlocked before it declared a mistrial, resulting in a Fifth Amendment violation. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court's ruling.
The state, in its briefing to the Supreme Court, argued that the Fifth Amendment was not violated when the judge declared a mistrial based on "manifest necessity", a determination left to the "sound discretion" of the judge, because federal courts defer these decisions to state courts who are better equipped to made this determination. There is no concensus on what constitutes a "dead locked" jury and although the courts of appeal are split on the question of whether a finding of "manifest necessity" is warranted based on jury deliberations exceeding a specific time, AEDPA directs federal courts to use a highly deferential standard of review.
Mr. Lett countered by recognizing AEDPA's directives but argued that this deferential standard of review is due only when a trial judge uses "sound discretion." There is a presumption against terminating jury deliberations when a verdict favorable to the defendant could be returned. Further, the judge must ensure that the jury is truly unable to reach a unanimous verdict before a mistrial is declared.
Lastly, Mr. Lett submitted that the trial court did not adequately reflect on her decision and failed to give him the opportunity to object to the ruling. If the Supreme Court considers his silence at the conclusion of the first trial to be a waiver, that procedural bar could preclude any relief.
RCS
